Tuesday, March 9, 2010

Market Valuations

Doug Short does some wonderful work on his blog www.dshort.com. He is kind enough let everybody use his information with the only requirement that we credit him. Well done Doug and thanks for your contributions. He recently has had a series of wonderful posts that lends us a "big picture" view of where we might be in this market cycle. Click on the charts to explode them for better viewing.

Is the Stock Market Cheap?
March 3, 2010 monthly update

Click to View Here's the latest update of my preferred market valuation method using the most recent Standard & Poor's "as reported" earnings and earnings estimates and the index monthly averages of daily closes through February 2010.


● TTM P/E ratio = 21.7
● P/E10 ratio = 20.1

Background
A standard way to investigate market valuation is to study the historic Price-to-Earnings (P/E) ratio using reported earnings for the trailing twelve months (TTM). Proponents of this approach ignore forward estimates because they are often based on wishful thinking, erroneous assumptions, and analyst bias.

The "price" part of the P/E calculation is available in real time on TV and the Internet. The "earnings" part, however, is more difficult to find. The authoritative source is the Standard & Poor's website, where the latest numbers are posted on the earnings page. Click on the Index Earnings link in the right hand column. Free registration is now required to access the data. Once you've downloaded the spreadsheet, see the data in column D.

The table here shows the TTM earnings based on "as reported" earnings and a combination of "as reported" earnings and Standard & Poor's estimates for "as reported" earnings for the next few quarters. The values for the months between are linear interpolations from the quarterly numbers.

The average P/E ratio since the 1870's has been about 15. But the disconnect between price and TTM earnings during much of 2009 was so extreme that the P/E ratio was in triple digits — as high as 122 — in the Spring of 2009. At the top of the Tech Bubble in 2000, the conventional P/E ratio was a mere 30. It peaked north of 47 two years after the market topped out.

As these examples illustrate, in times of critical importance, the conventional P/E ratio often lags the index to the point of being useless as a value indicator. "Why the lag?" you may wonder. "How can the P/E be at a record high after the price has fallen so far?" The explanation is simple. Earnings fell faster than price. In fact, the negative earnings of 2008 Q4 (-$23.25) is something that has never happened before in the history of the S&P 500.

The P/E10 Ratio
Legendary economist and value investor Benjamin Graham noticed the same bizarre P/E behavior during the Roaring Twenties and subsequent market crash. Graham collaborated with David Dodd to devise a more accurate way to calculate the market's value, which they discussed in their 1934 classic book, Security Analysis. They attributed the illogical P/E ratios to temporary and sometimes extreme fluctuations in the business cycle. Their solution was to divide the price by the 10-year average of earnings, which we'll call the P/E10. In recent years, Yale professor Robert Shiller, the author of Irrational Exuberance, has reintroduced the P/E10 to a wider audience of investors. As the accompanying chart illustrates, this ratio closely tracks the real (inflation-adjusted) price of the S&P Composite. The historic P/E10 average is 16.3.

The Current P/E10
After dropping to 13.4 in March 2009, the P/E10 rebounded above 20. The chart below gives us a historical context for these numbers. The ratio in this chart is doubly smoothed (10-year average of earnings and monthly averages of daily closing prices). Thus the fluctuations during the month aren't especially relevant (e.g., the difference between the monthly average and monthly close P/E10).


Of course, the historic P/E10 has never flat-lined on the average. On the contrary, over the long haul it swings dramatically between the over- and under-valued ranges. If we look at the major peaks and troughs in the P/E10, we see that the high during the Tech Bubble was the all-time high of 44 in December 1999. The 1929 high of 32 comes in at a distant second. The secular bottoms in 1921, 1932, 1942 and 1982 saw P/E10 ratios in the single digits.

Where does the current valuation put us?
For a more precise view of how today's P/E10 relates to the past, our chart includes horizontal bands to divide the monthly valuations into quintiles — five groups, each with 20% of the total. Ratios in the top 20% suggest a highly overvalued market, the bottom 20% a highly undervalued market. What can we learn from this analysis? Over the past several months, the decline from the all-time P/E10 high dramatically accelerated toward value territory, with the ratio dropping from the 1st to the upper 4th quintile in March. The price rebound since March has now put the ratio at the top of the 2nd quintile — quite expensive!

A more cautionary observation is that every time the P/E10 has fallen from the first to the fourth quintile, it has ultimately declined to the fifth quintile and bottomed in single digits. Based on the latest 10-year earnings average, to reach a P/E10 in the high single digits would require an S&P 500 price decline below 600. Of course, a happier alternative would be for corporate earnings to make a strong and prolonged surge. When might we see the P/E10 bottom? These secular declines have ranged in length from over 19 years to as few as three. The current decline is now nearing its tenth year.

Sunday, January 31, 2010

Confirmation Bias


Confirmation bias is the psychological phenomenon by which the mind seeks information which supports an already previously held belief and shuns information that contradicts the belief. For those of you that were fans of "Hogan's Heros" this is the Sgt. Schultz equivalent of "I see nothing and I know nothing." Despite the various capers perpetrated by Colonel Hogan, Hogan was always able to convince Sgt. Schultz to see what Sgt Schultz wanted to see.

What works in the world of comedy, can spell trouble for investors. Tthe Psy-Fi blog has a wonderful new missive on the confirmation bias:

http://www.psyfitec.com/2010/01/confirmation-bias-investors-curse.html

For those of you interested in the link between the brain and the investment process, there is a treasure trove of information on this blog and I link to it on the right side of the main page.

For those "really" interested, within the blog post is a reference to a paper by Raymond Nickerson. It is very lengthy but well worth the time:

http://psy2.ucsd.edu/~mckenzie/nickersonConfirmationBias.pdf

Thursday, December 31, 2009

2010 Forecasts

The Pragmatic Capitalist has aggregated the large institutional forecasts for 2010. Simply follow the links.

http://pragcap.com/the-ultimate-guide-to-2010-investment-predictions-and-outlooks

Tuesday, December 22, 2009

8 Resolutions!!

Credit goes to Gurufocus for this wonderful interview with money manager Jonathan Hirtle. Hirtle published 8 resolutions which provides a framework for investors.


1. I will remember that there is no free lunch. Stock market investing provides returns that are higher than returns from bonds and cash equivalents, because stocks are almost always more risky than bonds and cash equivalents. Periodically that risk is revealed through dislocation. That dislocation is the price I pay for higher returns. I will not commit more assets to stocks and stock-like investments, than I can tolerate during the next dislocation.

2. I will always be skeptical – but never cynical. Skepticism is healthy. Cynicism is not. Doomsday pessimism is just the mirror image of pie-in-the-sky optimism and both are highly unlikely. I will make prudent investment decisions based on likely, not unlikely, outcomes.

3. I will conduct my own due diligence. I will not invest because a friend has, or because recent returns have been high. Most of the best investment strategies in the world are based on common sense. If I can’t understand the investment process, I will not invest.

4. I will stay diversified. No matter how compelling an investment or an investment strategy sounds, I will only believe a little bit. Wealth is created and lost through concentration, and I dare not concentrate in a business or investment where I possess knowledge that is anything short of mastery.

5. I will think of risk in total. That means my operating risk and financial risk, as well as investment risk. Only families and organizations with strong, reliable cash flows and low debt levels can afford to pursue extraordinary returns through a risky investment strategy.

6. I will value my investment portfolio infrequently. Monthly at most. Quarterly is better. Daily valuation aggravates a false sense of gyrating value. Daily pricing has to do with supply and demand – not value. Value is created over long periods of time – a business cycle. I will match my investment horizon to the time it takes to drill new wells, develop new drugs and capture more market share – years, not days or months – and the longer, the better. Successful investing requires careful decisions driven by valuation and process, as well as the discipline to let that process work.

7. I will always care about price. There is no asset that is attractive at any price and there is almost no asset that is not attractive at some price. Price always matters. Price is the trump card. As price increases, risk often increases, so I will use quarterly cash flows to rebalance incrementally.

8. I will never forget the difference between investing and speculating. No matter how many times I hear it on television, I will remember that there is no such thing as a “speculative investor” or even a “short term investor.” Equating investing with speculating is like equating work with gambling. Speculating is not investing. Trading is not investing. Investing is investing. It is solely about acquiring future cash flows at an attractive price – period. If I do not know what price is attractive or if I know that an asset is overpriced, but I expect it to become even more overpriced, then I am speculating, not investing. While I can sometimes make money speculating, its outcome is far more random than that of investing.